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Panel: The Justice
Cascade in Latin
America
Beth Van Schaack, Moderator*
This panel considers the phenomenon of the Justice Cascade, a term that refers
to the idea that extraterritorial legal processes-such as criminal or civil
proceedings pursuant to universal jurisdiction or the exercise of international
jurisdiction-can trigger domestic legal processes within a country where such
processes had theretofore been impeded. Accountability may not easily be
forthcoming in countries that have experienced massive human rights violations or
systemic violence. Impediments include legal limitations, such as amnesty laws, or
political obstacles, such as prosecutors unwilling to indict perpetrators or judges
who are rejecting cases on pretextual procedural grounds. The Justice Cascade
thesis posits that even though legal processes commenced abroad may not be as
effective as domestic processes, such extraterritorial legal action can actually jump
start domestic processes in the target country.
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Panelist*
My job is to set the scene, talk about overall trends and hazards related to
justice in Latin America. Latin America was the scene of massive human rights
violations in the 1970's and 1980's. The numbers vary from country to country,
several hundred in some places, three to four thousand in Chile, at least ten to
fifteen thousand in Argentina, seventy thousand in Peru, and up to two hundred
thousand in Guatemala. The human rights violations encompassed massive
disappearances, massacres, torture, and forced exile. Eventually these military or
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military-controlled governments ceased and there was a return to civilian
government. The region has been a pioneer in a wide range of post conflict
actions. The first major truth commission was in Argentina followed by truth
commissions in a number of other Latin American countries. Argentina also held
the first national prosecutions of high-ranking military officers in 1985.
Although there were subsequent truth commissions in a number of other
countries, there was also a backlash, mainly in the form of national amnesty laws.'
As a result of the amnesty laws in the late 1980s through mid-1990's in Argentina,
Peru, Uruguay, Central America, and the refusal to annul the amnesty the military
had given itself in Chile, the situation of justice for human rights violations was
discouraging. Ten years later, however, the situation looks really different. Even
though Pinochet is dead without ever facing trial, the local courts were within a
month of actually beginning formal trial proceedings against him on human rights
and corruption-related charges. Over a hundred of his subordinates have been
convicted.
Also, thirty-five generals are now facing trial and are under
investigation. The amnesty law has now been severely limited. Several courts
have held that the amnesty law, first, never applied to cases involving forced
disappearance, and, second, has to be applied only at the end of all trial
proceedings. Only once it is established that the person is guilty can you think
about amnesty. Moreover, a number of judges have held that it does not apply at
all because it violates international law.
In Argentina, the "due obedience" amnesty law was declared unconstitutional in
2005 by the Argentinean Supreme Court. Pardons granted by then President
Menem in 1989 and 1990 were also annulled by the Supreme Court this year. The
legislature also passed a law annulling all of the amnesty laws. Several low-level
operatives have been convicted, and trials are under way against the surviving top
brass, including both the military and police.
In Peru, where the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission presented its
report a couple of years ago, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission also
presented a dossier of forty-three cases to the Prosecutors Office. The Prosecutor,
although reticent at first, has now moved forward on a significant number of cases.
In some cases, people are under investigation for trial and there have actually been
trial convictions in some of the emblematic cases. The amnesty law was also
annulled in Peru. Fujimori, who found his way back from Japan to Peru via Chile,
was arrested in Chile on a Peruvian arrest warrant and he is now under extradition
1.
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proceedings from Chile to Peru.
Uruguay was one of the last holdouts. The Uruguayans passed an amnesty law
right after the return to civilian government. There was a plebiscite in Uruguay to
decide whether the amnesty law was valid. The military appeared on television,
threatening new violence if the amnesty laws were found invalid. The plebiscite
came out approving the amnesty. That held until about two years ago, but there are
now cases opening in Uruguay against a number of high ranking military, and also
against the ex-President and the ex-Foreign Minister.
In Mexico, a Special Prosecutors Office was created in the last five years, which
indicted ex-President Echeverria and the former Chief of the Federal Police on
genocide charges. The case has gone back and forth around the question of
whether the statute of limitations can be tolled on grounds that for the period of
time that Echeverria was Head of State, he had immunity and could not be
prosecuted.
In Bolivia, General Garcia Meza, one of the first prosecutions in 1993, was
convicted and sentenced to thirty years in jail. Garcia Meza fled to Brazil for a
number of years, but eventually was caught and extradited back to Bolivia where
he is now serving his sentence. Another president, Sinchez de Lozada, is being
investigated for incidents in which troops opened fired on demonstrators a couple
of years ago.
Numerous ex-heads of state have been investigated or convicted on human
rights charges. And if you look more broadly, not just at human rights, but if you
look also at corruption charges, you can add another dozen or so who have either
been investigated or jailed. There is a surge as it were, and the question is why?
The Justice Cascade idea is correct, but it has to be seen in the context of domestic
changes as well. It is the confluence of the domestic and the international that is
creating this phenomenon.
Domestically, there is the persistence of human rights movements inside the
country. There are people who have not given up in fifteen or twenty years. These
people documented the abuses from the beginning and kept the files so they could
be used later. They also filed habeas petitions even when it was absolutely clear
that the petitions were not going anywhere. They looked for loopholes in amnesty
laws and for ways around statutes of limitations.
Now some of the doctrines that have been created internally have diffused from
one country to another. One of the interesting aspects of the Justice Cascade idea
is that it is not just a phenomenon coming from the outside into Latin America, but
is also an infusion from one national court to another, from one Prosecutors Office
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to another. For instance, the theory of overcoming the statute of limitations and
amnesty issues in disappearance cases has traveled around the continent: from
Chile to Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Central America. The theory is that since it
is unclear when the person is actually killed, we do not know when the amnesty
law is supposed to take affect, and since we can't tell when the amnesty law is
supposed to come into effect, it never does. There are a number of these kinds of
domestic legal theories.
There are also legal theories and influences that have come from international
law. For example, crimes against humanity are not subject to a statute of
limitations. The source of this rule is international treaties and jurisprudence as it
goes from state to state. The Inter-American system has been key both as a
diffuser and also as a norm setter. The Inter-American Commission's early
opposition to amnesty laws, its insistence on truth, prosecutions, reparations, and
the Court's decisions detailing the inaction of the domestic legal systems, have all
positively affected the domestic systems. The threat of substantial monetary
judgments of the Inter-American system creates pressure on the governments to
domestically prosecute these cases. For example, in the Plan de Sdnchez massacre
case against Guatemala the award was 7.2 million dollars in reparations for one
2
massacre.
With regard to events in a number of Latin American countries there are
transnational prosecutions either based on passive personality jurisdiction -that is,
victims who have the nationality of the state that is prosecuting-, or based on
universal jurisdiction. The effect of these cases was to start changing the political
context by re-imagining what could be done, making the government and the
judges have to support justice at home as an alternative to trials abroad, and
3
making even the military prefer domestic to foreign venues for trials.
However, there are limits. As you move from the investigation stage to the
actual trial stage, the number of cases significantly decreases, and the number of
convictions is still fewer. Even where defendants actually are arrested, because so
many of them are of advanced age, have lots of money and political connections,
or they burn their fingerprints off, it is very challenging to get them to stay in jail.
They either are out under house arrest, make bail, or they flee the country. In a
number of cases, there are special cushy Class A prisons, specially constructed for
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these high level defendants.
Also, because it has taken so long for this
phenomenon to take place, a lot of the defendants, witnesses, victims, and evidence
are gone. Even though the political will to try them is now there, the cases are not
triable because of these practical limitations.
Finally, the judicial decisions are not uniform. In parts of Latin America
precedent does not apply in the same way it does in the US. Therefore, there are
cases where the supreme court says one thing and six months later the same
supreme court will say something different in a different case. This also makes it
difficult to know if the current crop of positive decisions will persist over time.
But for now at least it is clearly the reality of the region.
Almudena Bernabeu, Panelist*
My goal is to try to find a balance between optimism and pessimism in the field
of human rights litigation by discussing specific human rights cases that we are
now trying from CJA. I would like to show how human rights litigation could
have a double effect: provides justice for the victims and could contribute to
important and necessary reforms in the countries where the violations took place.
Generally, I believe Latin America countries are well suited for seeking justice
through courts. However, the current successes have not been very uniform. I will
briefly talk about a positive example taking place right now in Guatemala while in
El Salvador, as a counterpart, absolutely nothing has happened internally as a
consequence of important cases tried internationally.
In 1999 a suit was filed against Guatemalan members of the High Command
under the universal jurisdiction provisions in Spain.4 From the moment it was
filed, Spanish prosecutors filed motions to dismiss on two grounds: (1) exhaustion
of remedies and (2) venue or jurisdiction of the Spanish Courts to hear the case.
The case on appeal made it all the way to the Constitutional Court, which is the
court of last resort. The Constitutional Court decision was pivotal in the role of
litigation of international crimes in national courts. Previously, the Spanish
Supreme Court had ruled in the sense of restricting the jurisdiction of Spanish
Courts under universal jurisdiction to cases that showed a "national interest".
Accordingly -stated the justices- only victims of Spanish nationality were able to
sue under such provisions. This was really a passive jurisdiction approach that
*
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destroyed the essence of the universal jurisdiction principles and violated to rights
of the victims. The Constitutional Court ruled later that such consideration
violated the universal part of universal jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction could not be
limited to the nationality of the victims.
With the case active and reinstated in Spain, a letter rogatory pending since
2004, needed to be executed in Guatemala. This immediately transferred the
proceedings to Guatemala. I should add here that all the defendants except for
Donaldo Alvarez Ruiz, (a total of eight members of the Guatemalan Government
and High Command, including former presidents Efrain Rios Montt and Romeo
Lucas Garcia) were at the time residing in Guatemala. The immediacy and real
threat of the rogatory going forward forced the defendants to seek for counsel and
challenged the ability of the Spanish Judge to exercise his jurisdiction in
Guatemala. They filed a Constitutional appeal that carried the suspension of all
proceedings. The situation was very tense. You had an important judge from Spain
sitting at a hotel waiting for the government and a bunch of judges in Guatemala to
make a decision on whether to recognize the exercise of Spanish jurisdiction on
Guatemalan soil or not. What it was behind this was a group of defendants who for
the first time realized that a team of lawyers had been working on the case and
some action was finally taking place. After the Spanish Constitutional Court
decision endorsed the genocide claim, we had filed an amended complaint to really
address it and there was in their land a judge with the intention of really doing
something about it.
Another factor to take into consideration is that Guatemala was applying to be a
permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. At the time, and
with a foreign judge appealing to international cooperation and reciprocity, we
realized that Guatemala has never signed a bilateral agreement with any country on
international criminal cooperation. This is only the beginning of a much larger
discussion on how little Guatemala has done to pass, ratify, or implement
international treaties or international laws. A strictly criminal procedural step was
suddenly knocking at the doors of the Guatemalan government. The situation
became almost a diplomatic issue when the defendants' counsel -and some judges
echoed- the question of the competence of a foreign judge to proceed in
Guatemalan soil.
Judge Pedraz was unable to depose the defendants and take the testimony of the
proposed witnesses. He left Guatemala when he realized that the appeal could take
up to a year to be resolved. Upon his arrival in Madrid, Spain, with our support as
private prosecutors, he issued international arrest warrants and orders to freeze the
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assets against the defendants.
Guatemala asserted that, because they do not have any cooperation or bilateral
agreements on these issues, the only documents they would attend to would be
those filed through the diplomatic channels which is basically a seventeenth
century system, with seven different government agencies getting involved, in my
opinion, another way of stalling the proceedings.
Instead of fighting a lost battle, we found out how to precede facilitating the
Judge and sending the documents respecting these diplomatic channels. Between
September and October 2006, Guatemalan authorities received the arrest warrants
properly filed. Surprisingly, they gave it to the competent court that open
extradition proceedings.
The court ordered the arrest and eventually the
extradition to Spain of their own national military leaders, which was by all
standards, unthinkable.
You have in Guatemala a succession of decisive events not only political but
judicial and sociological. All that was needed was a push and this case I believe,
provided it. Now our case that started in the Spanish courts, international by
definition, is suddenly back in Guatemala. We have been heavily criticized for
being invasive and maybe accelerating the process of reality and history.
Nevertheless, a case initially across the Atlantic and questioned for not being
representative, is now back in Guatemala shaking things up internally. This is
perhaps the most important aspect of this work and chain of events, the most
important lesson for all of us People are talking within Guatemala about reforms
not only of laws but structural reforms that could potentially affect the judiciary.
We do not know whether this will happen or not. The defendants have filed
several more appeals. However, Guatemala is incorporating international human
rights litigation and its contribution to the national fight against impunity. There is
a national debate and movement towards advancing the rule of law. People are
now working together and with better results. It is wonderful to witness.
A second example is El Salvador. I want to acknowledge the Human Rights
Institute of the University of Central America. This institute was founded by one
of the Jesuits assassinated in 1989 and was originally created to assist the refugees
of the Civil War. It has developed an expertise in filing cases before the InterAmerican Commission and Court. These cases have generated important
decisions. One of those, the Serrano Sisters case, pointed out the lack of
effectiveness of Salvadoran Courts and urges the government to take the necessary
steps to reopen national investigations to secure that these cases were not left
unresolved. According to legal professionals in El Salvador and human rights
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attorneys, nothing has been done yet. The Center for Justice and Accountability, in
the civil context has filed three important cases regarding human rights abuses in
El Salvador. Although our cases are only civil where you can only sue for
damages, they have been very important and carried important impact for the
Salvadoran society.
Terry Karl worked on all of them as an expert witness. Well, the second of our
cases regarding the assassination of Archbishop Romero 5 induced the Catholic
Church of El Salvador to make statements pointing out the importance of these
investigations and efforts against impunity. Civil society has been trying to get the
Catholic Church to help and has put pressure on the Church to be more active.
A third case 6 file by CJA on December 2003 was the first to propose that
Salvadoran Congress to repeal the amnesty law. The blanket amnesty law was in
part passed in opposition of the Jesuit's case. The Jesuit's case was tried nationally
in 1990. Later in 2001 a second case was filed that made it all the way to the
Supreme Court. This case represented an attempt to repeal the amnesty law that
did not succeed. The Supreme Court became diplomatic and decided that the
amnesty law would never apply to a human rights violation. Rather it will only
apply to political crimes, as yet to be determined. They left the prosecutors to
decide on a case by case basis whether a crime can be considered a political crime
or not. Unfortunately, no prosecutor has declared these crimes as human rights
violations, including the case of Monsignor Romero and they remained covered
under the amnesty.
Regardless of how important our work could be in Spain or in the United States,
these cases belong to the affected countries. All we can do and I believe we should
do is to keep doing a serious job to bring these cases. We believe these are valid
instruments for these countries to find justice. After the conflict and situations
lived, these countries are at a delicate stage while rebuilding their democracies and
getting stronger. I believe our work can play an important role for the victims to
obtain justice and empower them to keep seeking justice, which directly
contributes to the strengthening of their democratic institutions and their society.
Alex Huneeus, Panelist*

5.
6.
*
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I am going to look not just at the domestic situation of Chile but also at what is
happening in the Chilean judiciary. We will be taking a very close look at that
institution to try to figure out whether, and how, the Justice Cascade has changed
this institution.
It is true that, by his death in December 2006, Pinochet bilked the criminal
justice system in Chile. 60,000 of his supporters -who waited roughly seven
hours in the hot sun so that they could file by his coffin - brought the point home
when they victoriously chanted that now only God is going to be Pinochet's judge.
Scholars said that one of the preeminent human rights judges in Chile publicly
chastised the courts for having taken so long in reaching a judgment in the
Pinochet era cases. If these courts are to be faulted in dragging their feet in the
cases, they have to account for their change in attitude toward Pinochet era cases
generally.
One day after Pinochet's funeral the Penal Chamber of the Supreme Court
issued a ruling that, for the first time, rested solely on international law to strike
down the amnesty law passed in 1978 by the Pinochet regime to block prosecution
of its own crimes. 7 While this ruling broke new grounds, it was not an anomaly; it
only further unfolded what was already taking place in Chile. Starting in 1998,
nine months before Pinochet's arrest in London, Chile's judges began to actively
prosecute violations of human rights that were committed during the military
dictatorship. Judges reopened over 700 such cases that had been closed, stalled, or
filed as temporarily stayed. Some cases had not even been brought to the courts
yet. By 2006, over 100 sentences had been handed down to former members of the
regime. What is interesting about this activity is that, from the judicial point of
view, it has often outstripped and contradicted executive policies in the human
rights realm. For example, in 2005, President Lagos took steps to hinder courts
from taking on cases about torture from the Pinochet regime. Nonetheless, the
courts moved forward on these cases. Last October, Pinochet was arrested for
torture. My research, conducted between 2003 and 2005, sought to explain and
understand this turn towards prosecution by Chilean judges.
The turn is curious in light of what we already know about Chile's judges. We
know that the judiciary was the only branch of government that was left intact by
the military regime but yet, as one study shows, they cooperated fully with the
authoritarian regime in human rights violations.
Even after the return to
democracy, the judiciary failed to pursue Pinochet-era cases of human rights

7.
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abuses. Again, the same judges stayed on in the judiciary. During this time a few
high profile cases that were not covered by amnesty decree managed to inch
forward. But the bulk of Pinochet claims remained in legal limbo. The post-1990
judiciary has been slow to protect cases that do not have to do with Pinochet's
regime. As one scholar put it, Chile's "courts have never expanded, let alone
contributed to, a constitutional right." 8 My study sought to explain why, starting in
1998, this rights-averse judiciary placed itself in the thick of the country's most
contentious political issue.
The recent prosecution of the Pinochet cases provides an example of the
judiciary acting in a way that many perceive as more befitting for a liberal
institution in a democracy. The cases reveal a potential for this judiciary. On a
more general level, the inquiry's importance lies in the theme of how a new
attitude toward human rights gradually permeates through an institution that has its
roots in an illiberal era.
I interviewed over 40 judges and analyzed judicial opinions. I found a struggle
within the judiciary over its own role in the past. I argue that the contest within the
judiciary, this exchange of ideas and institutional debate about its own role in the
current democracy as well as in the past democracy, has shaped its response to the
Pinochet-era cases. The interviews reveal three conflicting role conceptions that
are floating around within the judiciary. They rest implicitly on ideas about what
the law is but also on their political role and they involve the law's role within a
political system. I labeled these conceptions the Formalist view, the Deference
view, and the Responsive view.
The first view is the Formalist view. Judges must strictly follow the letter of the
law and the law is separate from politics. It does not have an internal reference to
morality. Formalism and legalism have long been the adjectives that are used to
describe the Chilean judiciary and, in fact, judges describe themselves this way
with pride. My finding is that it is a role conception with waning popularity.
Judges' responses were rarely legalist and the conception came up in interviews
more as something to be criticized then as something the judges were actually
avowing as a way of being a judge. Rather, legalism cannot be considered the
strongest role conception within the Chilean judiciary.
Like the positive legal philosophy in post-World War Germany, formalism in
Chile has come to be identified with the judiciary's failure to protect rights during

8.
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the military dictatorship. The Truth in Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") itself
charged the judiciary with many problems, but one of them was an exaggerated
formalism in interpreting the law. Now it seems these critiques have had their
effects; they have seeped into the judiciary and only two judges I interviewed
could be considered self-consciously legalists. This idea of formalism has fallen so
much that another justice complained to me bitterly that the press had actually
called them legalists and said that they were just appliers of the law.
The second view is the Deference view. The transcripts of my interviews
contained a lot of discussion about judging that did not fit into the continuum of
formalism and anti-formalism, which is how we usually debate about this. Here it
was common for judges to say judging was an act of deference and they justify
their actions by what their superiors wanted them to do. The judiciary's internal
norms outweighed the legal text or a personal policy preference or moral concerns
in decision-making. One judge, when I asked why she was investigating a case of
Pinochet era violations, said there is a political sanction. Today, it is Judges who
do not investigate who feel they will suffer repercussions in their career. I should
say as an aside that Chile's judiciary, unlike the U.S., is a bureaucratic judiciary.
Judges enter young and slowly work their way up. Their superiors decide on their
promotions and so does the executive; it is a joint decision. They are always
looking to their superiors and to the executive for signals as to how they should
make decisions. It shows somehow that it is culturally accepted within the
judiciary to think of the role in this way.
The third view that I found is the Responsive view. Here the judges invoked
the cycle of wronged penitence and redemption in explaining why they were
looking into Pinochet-era cases. I will give you one quote from an appellate judge,
"the judiciary acknowledges that during the dictatorship it did not fulfill its role. It
knows it has a pending debt and it has permitted an omission. It knows the only
way to solve the problem is to confront the issue, even belatedly." As another
judge put it, the only option available to the judiciary is for it to act as it should.
The importance of reopening a case lies in redressing not only the past wrong
committed by the perpetrator, but the past wrong committed by the judiciary in not
investigating the case at the time.
The motive of redemption harbors within it in an understanding of the judicial
role as responsive to public concerns and morality and not just the commands of
the superior. The responsive judging "strives for moral and political legitimacy,"
as one judge said. Nineteen of the respondents of my interviews could be
characterized as most often describing their work in this way.
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Therefore, we found that there are different ideas within the judiciary. This
may seem commonplace, but in truth, most scholars based in the U.S., when
looking at judiciaries outside the U.S., ascribe to them a single monolithic view on
the law. It is interesting to note, even in a small, very conservative judiciary there
are varying views on their roles. Specifically, we found that there has been a shift
in formalism as an ideal, and there is a rise in the responsive conception of the role,
at least in Pinochet-era cases.
On the basis of these findings I would like to theorize about the Justice Cascade,
as well as the Chilean judiciary and its prognosis. The Justice Cascade will force
the judiciary in Chile to change via two distinct mechanisms. One main
mechanism for the judicial turnaround is the executive's actions. Judges, by their
own description, were deferring to the executive and their superiors when they
decided to investigate these cases. Once Pinochet was detained, President Lagos
pushed for the judiciary to help find the disappeared people through a series of
policy changes and statements. This signaled to the judges what they should do.
There was also another mechanism, that of institutional shame. Judges were
ashamed and sought redemption. These judges experienced a genuine change of
heart vis-A-vis human rights in the past. Some experienced a change of heart and
some were newcomers to the judiciary.
The next question is what does all this mean for the Chilean judiciary? Many
people ask, when will this judiciary, existing amidst such a flourishing democracy,
finally step up to the plate and be more effective in defending human rights and
constitutional rights in general? My data confirms that many in the Chilean
judiciary have a cultural tendency toward a deferential position to the executive.
However, I also found dissent within the institution and discovered moments in
which judges are moved to impose a more responsive orientation to their role.
The reason why responsive judges were able to advance the Pinochet-era cases
further than the government wanted was due to public interest in, and the close
press coverage of, the cases which presented a window of opportunity for the
judges. Neither the government nor the hierarchical superiors could push back
without risking that the public would find out, especially given all of the press
coverage and the public interest that the cases invoked. An example of this was a
judge who actually announced that he was receiving phone calls from members of
the government while he was investigating the Pinochet case. This provided a
window of opportunity for someone like Guzman 9 to push back and impose or
9.
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perform a different view of judging.
Nonetheless I do not think these cases argue that a progressive move towards a
more responsive judging is at large in the Chilean judiciary. The cases are unique
because of the intense debates surrounding them. My data points instead to an
entrenchment of this deference mode, and how the relationship to authority and
hierarchy in the Chilean judiciary undermines the debate between formalism and
anti-formalism philosophies of judging.
Chile's democratization has taken place without a vibrant autonomous
judiciary, and it will continue to do so. The story of the prosecution reveals, rather,
how an insular state institution struggles to regain, and above all, protect its place,
even as the political world is altered.
Terry Lynn Karl, Panelist*
The very first thing that we discuss when we talk about contemporary Latin
America is its wave of democracy. One of the things that you note with this wave
of democracy is a significant change in political and civil rights. You can measure
and see it; I call this human rights change the "Transition Effect." When there is a
transformation from military to a civilian rule, there is a transition effect, and it is
very notable in all of these countries.
Does it make any difference for human rights that these countries are becoming
democratic? We have a half full, half empty story because, on the one hand, it
makes a really big difference in countries to the extent we can measure these
differences. On the other hand, we also know that when we look at Latin America
there are very imperfect democracies in place and different ways that political
scientists classify these government; we only call some democracies. We call
some liberal democracies, semi-democracies, partial democracies, soft
democracies, hard democracies, soft authoritarianism, hard authoritarianism, and
so on; there is a wide variety of language and labeling. What this basically means
is that we do not have any open authoritarian regimes anymore. But there is a
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difference between these groups of "democratic" countries, whether they have
elections or not, o how meaningful those elections are, and how much an electoral
system seems to affect the civil and political rights.
The transitional surge, the one with transitions to democracy from authoritarian
rule, really began in the mid-80's. Now there is a second spike going on that starts
around 2000 when governments of the left take power. What is interesting is that
Latin America is changing very fast, from a political point of view. For example,
if you look at Eva Morales or Chavez, or the left/ victories in Chile in 2000 and
2006, or at Brazil 2002 and 2006, or Argentina in 2003, Uruguay in 2005, Bolivia
in 2006, Nicaragua in 2006, and so on, depending on how you classify different
presidents. Basically there is a left of center shift happening in Latin America.
What difference does that make? There is something else happening now - a
different kind of rights effect.
I want to describe the region first of all just in terms of rights, as there is really
an extraordinary variation in the region, and ask how are the differences explained.
When I say there is an extraordinary variation in the region of Latin America as a
whole, this is where the glass is half full. We should be pleased about "justice
cascades" no matter what issues we may have about a range of other things. There
has been slow and steady improvement since the initial democratic transitions on a
range of indicators in Latin America. Some countries have seen some setbacks in
the '90s, particularly around Fujimori in Peru, Haiti, and parts of Central America,
but by and large in the region, there was definitely a transition effect and it
continued a very gradual, by and large steady regional improvement. Now, when
you look at that improvement there is a variation by the types of freedoms and
rights you measure, and also by the countries themselves. All countries do really
well on freedom of religion and freedom of movement in Latin America. The real
problems are with political freedoms: freedom of assembly, freedom of expression
and, most importantly, the independence of courts. If I had to make a hierarchy of
rights problems, the big problem areas would be assembly, expression,
independence of courts, personal integrity and safety of people. We have this kind
of variation by type of rights.
Then there is also this extraordinary variation when you look inside the region.
The best performers are Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. The countries that once
were the nightmares of rights violations with military regimes have not only shown
a transition effect, but they show another surge of progress as democracy deepens
and as parties of the left become more dominant. The intermediary countries that
follow in the middle are generally the Andes countries, Colombia aside. Colombia
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is obviously the highest violator of rights currently on the continent. With the
exception of a backward move in Peru under Fujimori, and a decline in rights
progress in Venezuela beginning prior to the Chavez regime, there is a kind of an
intermediary category with the Andes. The countries that are really all over the
map are in Central America. They show the greatest fluctuations, with the
exception of Costa Rica, which is very stable.
Let me try to give you a series of possible explanations for these variations and
then tell you where I think I am starting to come down in a current study in
progress. What are the arguments to explain these variations? One could be
international catalyst. For example, Pinochet gets arrested in Spain and this causes
the change in Chile. This may be plausible, but it can only work for Chile; it is
really not going to work for anybody else. There is no comparable story anywhere
that has the same application of international power. And both Alex Hunneus'
work and our data shows that this is not even an adequate story for Chile. To the
extent that we try to measure the impact of those cases, it does not appear that there
is a large international catalyst to improve rights. There is also an argument in the
democratization literature about the transition effect from a military regime to a
civilian regime.
Because you get all the trappings and procedures of
democratization, this forces certain kinds of human rights issues. As we have seen,
this is significant. But the question remains as to what would happen if you did not
have a transition effect. In other words, where is a country that has no transition
effect, or if there is a transition, it is from one type of civilian to another form of
civilian rule rather than outright authoritarian rule to some form of democratic
rule? The interesting case is Venezuela. This country is a case of a democratic
electoral party system collapsing and being replaced by a military officer who runs
in the political system as a political candidate. It is not a military to civilian
transition. And here, we see no positive transition effect. Instead, there is no
demonstrable transition effect and, in many respects, continuity.
In the
Venezuelan case, the violation of rights precedes Chavez, which is very important.
The violations rose quite significantly in the five years before Chavez, and they
continue the same trend. Instead of having a dramatic change, we have a tendency
to incrementally climb, which we have in all kinds of other countries where there is
no dramatic regime change from military to civilian rule.
There are other possible arguments about why these kinds of particularly
regional variations in democracy happen. The most powerful predictor of whether
a country becomes democratic is actually whether its neighbors become
democratic. The contagion is really important in democratization. If Uruguay is
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becoming democratic, you are going to be pretty sure the neighbors are going to be
infected in some way. There is also a very strong regional contagion effect in
some of these regions because, just like there is more cooperation between
Uruguay, Argentina, and Chilean military and political figures, there also is more
cooperation between lawyers. People find out what other people are doing in the
same region, and they learn that way, thus there is interregional contagion.
What I really think is going on here (and, because I am a political scientist I
have to look for a political explanation) has to do with the empowerment of the
left. I want to talk about why I think this is so important and why countries where
there is no change in power are unlikely to change their rights patterns, whereas
countries that have actually significant shifts in who is in power will change their
rights patterns. It is important to look at the party structures of countries, not just
the political party structures but the relationship between parties and militaries, as
well as the relationships between parties and the church. Those political
relationships will tell you a great deal about what is going to happen in the rights
story. Let me give you some examples: One illustration is a type of "deference
effect" in the judicial system. We see this both when the party in power is from the
right; there is deference to the right. When the party in power becomes the left,
then there is a type of judicial deference to the left. When this happens, all kinds
of rights issues that were not on the agenda before now are on the agenda. Party
arty change affects who you defer to and how the judicial system co-exists with the
executive branch. It is an odd argument because it is almost like a climate
argument, which is to say that the way judges make decisions and who they are
aiming to please responds to changes in the political sphere. The argument
involves a trickle down theory, where the top changes, and therefore the judges
begin to think of rights in a different way.
But that is only one piece of the story; I think the other piece of the story is in
the countries where I see the post-2000 surge going on, which is coming up from
below. Those involved in this surge are the people who were justice seekers under
authoritarian rule and have remained justice seekers, whoever they are. No matter
whether they were victimized themselves influenced because they defended other
victims, when you look at the Argentine, Chilean or Uruguayan political systems,
for example, you realize you are dealing with people who are actually deeply
involved in human rights issues and suddenly may even become president.
Those justice seekers have the following relationships. The most important one
is a link to a party in power, which means that the way justice is normally
negotiated in the political system is through compromise. In the past, the fear has
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been that the pressure from the justice seekers can push parties and leaders further
than they want to go, endangering democracy. But over time, as the fear of
authoritarian reversion diminishes, this politics of compromise give way to a kind
of normative politics - a politics which says that justice must be sought, that this is
owed to the dead. I am beginning to see a pattern in that the groups that were the
most repressed in different places are the groups that are the greatest justice
seekers. For example, the Communist Party in Chile took a large role in the
initiation of lawsuits because it also took the brunt of a repression. Groups that
move the justice agenda forward have certain qualities that are the same. That is
what I call the "repressed left effect;" they are justice seekers. They tend to be
educated and have greater resources so there is a very strong national element in
this story.
This aspect is ironic in the way that it usually plays itself out. For example,
given their human rights records, you would expect El Salvador to do worse in
improvements and Guatemala to do better; yet, it is the other way around. The
switch is because of the kinds of international links we are talking about are just so
much more difficult when you are dealing, not in just Spanish, but with eleven
indigenous languages, or you are dealing with people who never traveled. They
are the kinds of people who would not go into a court in their country in a million
years, who just have a whole different culture.
Let me just end by showing you a drawing that illustrates the very dramatic
difference between Chile and El Salvador. The reason I want to show you this is it
shows you the political nature of rights. The higher the line, the worse off you the
country is on rights. The higher line is El Salvador and the lower line is Chile.
What is interesting about this is that El Salvador's changes in rights come from a
series of events that happened during the civil war itself and, to a lesser extent,
during the peace agreement. Once the peace agreements happened nothing else
happens; there is no further improvement in rights. This flat line you see is El
Salvador and absolutely nothing is happening. The paramilitary was one of the
sides of the civil war, which was responsible for most of the human rights abuses
in El Salvador, and today the party that grew out of that paramilitary is still in
power. This party has absolutely no interest in opening this up. The judiciary is
still not independent. It may have been improved in a number of ways, but its
deference is towards the party that encouraged massive human rights violations.
There is absolutely no interest in changing.
The contrast with Chile is interesting because El Salvador and Chile are the
only two countries in Latin America that have a really strong left, a really strong
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right and a strong center. They are kinds of a 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 countries so their
opinions on a lot of things look similar. However, when you look at the story in
Chile there is this huge drop in rights abuses. That is the transition effect and then
you see the combination of the Pinochet case and Richard Lagos Escobar coming
into power, which I would call the left effect. Then you see another huge drop.
You do not see this in El Salvador, but you are beginning to see a difference in
Guatemala, where there is a huge political interest in using these cases against
different political actors who are well-known rights violators, which is not the case
in El Salvador.
Finally, the left in Latin America has always prioritized socioeconomic issues
and issues of addressing poverty above civil and political liberties, and that
difference has been huge. Traditionally, everything was about addressing poverty
and development issues, so-called second generation rights, instead of those of the
first generation. But what is interesting is you see a somewhat different balance of
first and second generation rights happening now. The ideology of defining a
hierarchy of rights has changed somewhat based on who is in power and what has
happened to them in their own experience. Leaders who have experienced
repression, or whose friends and families have been affected, are valuing political
and civil rights more than they have in the past, with Venezuela being the only
exception.
The reason Venezuela is a dramatic exception is that the country does not have
any recent history of serious internal repression. Yet it does have a real and grave
history of massive problems in the distribution of its oil wealth. Thus the priority
given by other countries to civil and political rights is simply not there. Instead,
the situation is similar to Cuba or to a more traditional left in another time; rights
are considered an instrument that the imperialists use to batter countries they do
not like. You see this similarity manifested in the Venezuelan and the Cuban
patterns of voting on every single human rights piece of legislation in the United
Nations. The two countries vote the same, and they vote against the Americans.
This means that they will support Turkmenistan, North Korea, Kazakhstan, or
whomever, regardless of the record of human rights violations, because for them
an insistence on rights protections is viewed a violation of national sovereignty.
To them, rights criticism is a way of hitting small countries or preparing the ground
for forcible regime change rather than a separate discourse that people in other
parts of the region, feeling less threatened, have learned to value in itself.

